UAE Competition Law – Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition

In July 2026, the UAE Ministry of Economy & Tourism (the Ministry) published its Guidelines on Relevant Market Definition (the Guidelines), issued within the framework of Federal Decree-Law 36 of 2023 on the Regulation of Competition (Federal Competition Law 2023), its Executive Regulations and the decisions issued in implementation thereof.

 

The Guidelines do not replace the applicable legal framework. Rather, they set out the minimum common methods, stages and procedures that may be adopted when defining the relevant market as part of any economic concentration (merger control) filing as well as across all competition enforcement contexts beyond merger control. The Guidelines provide that they are to act as a primary reference point for the establishment of the relevant market however, it is also noted that irrespective of such methodologies and principles, the relevant market must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

 

The Guidelines follow the introduction of revised merger control thresholds in 2025 and the adoption in April 2026 of implementing regulations for the Federal Competition Law 2023.

 

An EU-aligned, two-dimensional approach

 

Consistent with the definition of “relevant market” in Article 1 of Federal Competition Law 2023, and in general reflecting the methodology of the European Commission, the Guidelines define the relevant market by reference to two dimensions: (i) the relevant product market; and (ii) the relevant geographic market. The Guidelines expressly draw on international competition law including European Commission decisions and adopt the analytical tools familiar to EU practitioners, most notably the hypothetical monopolist (SSNIP) test.

 

A notable modernisation is the express recognition that the geographic dimension may be physical, digital or virtual, so that digital platforms and online marketplaces may themselves constitute a relevant geographic scope.

 

(i) The relevant product market

 

The relevant product market comprises all goods or services that, by reference to their price, characteristics and intended use, are regarded by customers or users as substitutable to satisfy a particular need or at least a substantial part of it. Product substitutability is treated as fundamental for defining the relevant products and market.

 

To assess substitutability, the Guidelines endorse:

 

➢ the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test, asking whether a small but significant, non-transitory price increase (typically 5–10% above competitive levels) would result in demand switching to potential substitute products available within the geographic area or to products available in other geographic areas. The more the entity is unable to raise the prices of its products in the market, the stronger the indication that it is subject to competitive pressures. Consequently, potential substitutes that generate these competitive constraints should be included when defining the relevant market;

 

➢ the price elasticity of demand test, assesses the degree of demand-side substitution, reflecting the inverse relationship between the price of a product and the quantity demanded. The Guidelines note that although price is the most important element in defining the relevant market, it is not the only element as consumer choices may also be based on factors such as quality and consumer preference; and

 

➢ the SSNDQ test (a small but significant, non-transitory decrease in quality) a test adopted by the European Commission in its assessment of disputes relating to the quality of digital services where competition turns on quality rather than price. It is however acknowledged in the Guidelines that this test does have practical difficulties given that it lacks a definitive method for measuring product quality.

 

Beyond price, the Guidelines list a range of verification criteria including product characteristics, intended use, customer preferences, evidence of past substitution, switching costs and barriers (such as exclusivity arrangements, network effects and regulatory approvals), and price differentiation between customer segments. Supply-side substitutability is treated as a secondary input to market definition relevant only where the competitive response is immediate and effective.

 

(ii) The relevant geographic market

 

The relevant geographic market is the physical or digital location where supply and demand for a product or service meet and where competition is similar or homogeneous. Conditions are not homogeneous where undertakings face materially different regulatory, licensing, pricing or fiscal regimes across areas so that such differences justify treating the areas as separate markets. The geographic scope of the relevant market can be national, local or even smaller. Reflecting the Federal Competition Law 2023, the Ministry will treat a matter at emirate level where the undertakings concerned are present only within one emirate and the effects do not extend beyond it, and as national where they operate across, or effects extend beyond, a single emirate. Article 3 of the Federal Competition Law 2023 further extends the regime to activities conducted outside the UAE that affect competition within it.

 

The same substitution logic is applied geographically. The Ministry’s verification indicators include:

 

➢ whether a price increase in the focal area would divert demand (or supply) to neighbouring areas;

 

➢ transportation costs, distance and time (relevant to defining “catchment areas”), particularly for retail and distribution;

 

➢ customer preferences and purchasing behaviour, including national or local preferences; and

 

➢ the significance of imports, which may extend the market beyond the UAE only where the associated barriers are shown not to impede timely and effective supply.

 

Comment

 

The Guidelines are a welcome step towards transparency and predictability, and their close alignment with established EU methodology will reassure international parties and their advisers. For undertakings contemplating economic concentration applications, a rigorous, evidence-based market definition anchored in the Ministry’s stated tests and verification criteria will be central both to the economic report accompanying any merger control filing and to the assessment of whether the applicable thresholds are met. ■

Proposed Amendments to DIFC Funds Framework

The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) has issued Consultation Paper 173 (the Consultation Paper), proposing a review of its collective investment fund framework. The proposed changes would replace the current private fund classification framework with a more flexible, disclosure-led model accommodating multi-strategy and hybrid funds.

 

The Consultation Paper will be of particular interest to current fund managers, fund administrators, persons managing assets and custody providers licensed in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), as well as to prospective future applicants.

 

Some notable proposals are:

 

➢ removal of specialist class categorisations for Qualified Investor Funds (QIFs) and Exempt Funds;

 

➢ closure of the External Fund Manager (EFM) route for non-DFSA licensed managers;

 

➢ updated credit fund regime;

 

➢ expanded definition of what constitutes a “Fund Manager”;

 

➢ new employee co-investment route; and

 

➢ initial consultation on tokenisation and long-term investment funds.

 

Removal of fixed classifications

 

Specialist class labels (QIFs or Exempt Funds) presently determine the requirements applicable to a given fund. The DFSA considers this ill-suited to hybrid and multi-strategy mandates. It proposes to remove the specialist class requirements for Exempt Funds constituted as money market or private equity funds, and for Exempt Funds and QIFs constituted as credit funds.

 

Closure of the External Fund Manager route

 

Subject to meeting certain criteria, fund managers established outside the DIFC are permitted to manage DIFC-domiciled funds without being licensed by the DFSA. The DFSA proposes to withdraw this route. Managers of DIFC funds would need to establish a DIFC presence, transfer the fund to a locally licensed manager, or restructure. The DFSA has indicated that it will engage with current EFMs on funds in existence. Affected managers may wish to begin that engagement early.

 

New way of categorising credit funds

 

The DFSA proposes to remove the requirement that 90 percent of a fund’s property be used to provide credit in order for it to be constituted as a credit fund. A fund with a more modest strategy of credit allocation, outside the class today, may therefore be deemed to constitute a credit fund under the proposed framework. The Consultation Paper proposed that the base capital requirement for credit fund managers fall from USD 140,000 to USD 40,000, and that the application and annual renewal fees be removed.

 

More parties falling under the definition of “Fund Manager”

 

The current definition of a “Fund Manager” turns on legal accountability to unitholders and contractual obligations to the fund vehicle. The DFSA proposes to amend the Collective Investment Law 2 of 2010 (CIL) so that a person falls within the definition even where not legally accountable directly to unitholders. Existing fund managers would remain subject to the statutory duty to act in unitholders’ best interests, and the DFSA states that investor protection would not be reduced. The practical effect, however, is that persons who are not directly accountable to unitholders may fall within the definition, and therefore also be subject to the regulatory oversight of the DFSA.

 

Employee investment in funds

 

The DFSA proposes to permit employees to invest in private funds managed by their employer. Neither the minimum initial subscription – presently USD 500,000 for a QIF and USD 50,000 for an Exempt Fund – nor the net worth test for ‘professional client’ classification would apply, provided employees meet certain criteria. The relief is confined to employees of the fund manager, or of a DFSA-licensed firm authorised to conduct the regulated activity of ‘Managing Assets’, who are directly involved in executing the fund’s investment decisions or advising the manager on them. Investment could also be made indirectly through a vehicle established for that purpose, which would not constitute a “fund” for regulatory purposes, and limited to the same staff.

 

Next steps

 

The Consultation Paper requests additional feedback on two specific topics: (i) tokenisation and (ii) long-term investment funds. This may be indicative of the nature of future changes to the DIFC’s funds framework. Comments to the Consultation Paper have been requested to be sent to the DFSA by 7 September 2026.

 

Managers and applicants should assess whether their strategies, borrowing arrangements, authorisations and risk management documentation remain workable under the revised perimeter.

 

Afridi & Angell is well placed to assist fund managers, fund administrators and applicants in assessing the impact of the Consultation Paper, in preparing consultation responses, and in undertaking the licensing and restructuring work that may follow. ■

The New UAE Civil Code: Force Majeure and Hardship

Federal Decree-Law 25/2025 Issuing the Civil Transactions Law (the New Code) came into force on 1 June 2026. It replaced Federal Law 5/1985 Concerning the Issuance of the Civil Transactions Law (the Old Code).

 

This inBrief forms part of a series examining the changes introduced by the New Code, and deals with the provisions governing force majeure and hardship.

 

Unlike common law jurisdictions, force majeure and hardship find statutory expression in the UAE. Force majeure refers to unforeseeable events beyond the parties’ control which renders performance impossible, while the doctrine of hardship refers to exceptional circumstances where performance remains possible but becomes more onerous or radically different than originally contemplated by the parties.

 

While these doctrines were recognised under the Old Code, the New Code makes the remedies clearer, more flexible, and more commercially usable.

 

1.  What was the position under the Old Code?

 

The Old Code contained a framework governing force majeure, including partial and temporary impossibility, and hardship in contractual and non-contractual obligations.

 

(i) Force majeure

 

Article 273 of the Old Code addressed the consequences of force majeure, including total, partial and temporary impossibility of performance.

 

➢ Total impossibility: If force majeure rendered performance impossible, the corresponding obligation ceased and the contract was automatically cancelled.

 

➢ Partial and temporary impossibility: Where performance became partially or temporarily impossible, the impossible part (i.e., the corresponding obligation) was extinguished. In both cases, the obligor (i.e., the party which owed performance) could cancel the contract, provided the party to whom performance was owed to was notified of the impossibility.

 

(ii) Hardship

 

Article 249 of the Old Code empowered a court to reduce or adjust a burdensome obligation to a reasonable level while having regard to the interests of both parties, where exceptional circumstances of a public nature arose that could not have been foreseen at the time of entering into the contract, which rendered performance burdensome and threatened the obligor with grave loss. Any agreement to the contrary was void.

 

2.  What are the changes introduced under the New Code?

 

The New Code retains the underlying principles of force majeure and hardship, and expands the reliefs that may be sought.

 

(i) Force majeure

 

Article 236 of the New Code retains the position under the Old Code in cases of total impossibility, i.e., if force majeure renders performance impossible, corresponding obligations cease, and the contract is cancelled automatically. The principal changes concern the treatment of partial and temporary impossibility.

 

➢ Partial impossibility: Where performance is partially impossible, either party, not just the obligor (as was the case under the Old Code), may seek discharge from the corresponding obligation(s), or apply to the court for recission of the contract.

 

➢ Temporary impossibility: Similar to the remedy for partial impossibility, where impossibility is temporary in a continuing contract, either party may seek discharge from the corresponding obligation(s), apply to the court for recission, and/or additionally, seek modification of the contract.

 

➢ Loans for specific things (العارية): The New Code also addresses circumstances in which a borrower may remain liable despite force majeure. Article 804(2) provides that a borrower may remain liable for the loss or destruction of a borrowed item where the loss could have been avoided by sacrificing the borrower’s own property, or where the borrower chose to save their own property instead (Article 804(2)).

 

(ii) Harship

 

The New Code more clearly articulates the range of remedies available to the court. Where the commercial bargain can sensibly be saved, the court may adjust it; and if it cannot, the court may order rescission. Under the Old Code, the court only modify the terms of the contract, and could not order recission.

 

3.  Why the change matters?

 

(i) Commercial and contractual impact

 

➢ Real disruption resulting from a force majeure or hardship event rarely fits neatly into legal boxes. A supply chain disruption, regulatory change, labour shortage or geopolitical event may affect contractual performance in different ways and to different degrees. The New Code recognises this reality and makes clear that both parties may seek relief, while granting the courts broader remedial powers that are no longer limited to cancellation, as was the position under the Old Code.

 

Force Majeure

 

➢ By way of example, where a force majeure event temporarily reduces a supplier’s production capacity, the New Code allows the contract to be preserved, through temporary adjustments to the parties’ obligations. This is commercially significant as the focus shifts from an all-or-nothing outcome towards preserving a commercially workable arrangement, where possible.

 

➢ The amendments are likely to be particularly significant in the context of long-term commercial relationships, including supply, infrastructure, logistics, outsourcing and distribution arrangements, where temporary disruption may not justify termination of the contractual relationship, but equally may require the parties’ obligations to be adjusted to reflect changed circumstances.

 

Hardship

 

➢ The New Code does not permit contracts to be revisited merely because a party has made an unfavorable bargain, which was also the case under the Old Code. However, where exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances render performance excessively onerous, the court is empowered to rescind the contract as well to adjust the obligations of the parties.

 

➢ This is significant because hardship cases often fall between two unsatisfactory outcomes. While strict enforcement of the contract may become excessively onerous, cancellation may be commercially wasteful. The New Code makes the middle ground easier to identify and ensures that parties will focus less on artificial labels and more on the remedy that best fits the disruption.

 

(ii) Litigation impact

 

➢ The practical shift under the New Code is that parties are likely to spend less time debating rigid classifications and more time addressing the consequences of the disruption itself. That is the practical shift: the New Code makes it plain that both parties can seek remedies, and that the court has a wider remedial toolkit. The emphasis therefore moves away from a narrow argument about classification and towards the practical question: what remedy fits the disruption?

 

➢ This may be particularly important in disputes where the parties agree that an external event has affected performance but disagree as to the appropriate response. The New Code provides clearer statutory mechanisms for preserving, modifying or terminating contractual relationships depending on the circumstances.

 

4.  Practical takeaways

 

Dos

➢ Address remedies and consequences at the drafting stage: Parties should decide in the contract what happens if performance becomes impossible, partially impossible, temporarily impossible or exceptionally onerous. The key question is not just whether a force majeure or hardship event has occurred, but what contractual consequences and remedies should follow.

 

➢ Use bespoke force majeure and hardship clauses and define assumed risks clearly: A generic force majeure or hardship clause may not be sufficient. If inflation, sanctions, war, shipping disruption, labour shortages, currency movement, material shortages or regulatory delay are intended to sit with one party, say so expressly.

 

➢ Decide in advance what follows from the disruption: The clause should also address notice requirements, mitigation measures, suspension rights, partial performance, temporary modification, extension of time, price adjustment, cost-sharing, renegotiation procedures, and termination rights.

 

➢ Build in a process for preserving the contract: Parties should consider including contractual mechanisms designed to preserve the relationship during periods of disruption, where disruption occurs but continuation of the contractual relationship remains commercially viable.

 

➢ Consider the wider range of judicial remedies available: The New Code provides clearer statutory mechanisms through which parties may seek judicial relief, including preservation, modification, or recission of contractual obligations where the statutory requirements are satisfied. A party resisting relief may still argue that the relevant risk was foreseeable, assumed, insured against or allocated by the contract.

 

➢ Comply strictly with any contractual notice requirements (where applicable): Delayed or inadequate notice may prejudice a party’s ability to rely on force majeure or hardship provisions.

 

Don’ts

 

➢ Do not confuse commercial difficulty with hardship: Every increase in cost, reduction in profitability or commercial inconvenience may not constitute hardship.

 

➢ Do not assume that force majeure automatically leads to termination: The appropriate remedy will depend on whether the impossibility is total, partial or temporary and the circumstances of the case. A party will not automatically be entitled to terminate the contract.

 

➢ Do not exclusively rely on the remedies contained in the New Code: Seek legal advice and incorporate contractual provisions to clearly allocate risk and prescribe the consequences of disruption.

 

➢ Do not wait for a dispute before exploring solutions: Parties should consider at an early stage whether contractual performance can be modified, suspended or otherwise preserved before a dispute arises. ■

Arbitration Procedures and Practice in the UAE: Overview, Practical Law Global Guide

A Q&A guide to arbitration law and practice in the United Arab Emirates.

 

The country-specific Q&A guide provides a structured overview of the key practical issues concerning arbitration in this jurisdiction, including any mandatory provisions and default rules applicable under local law, confidentiality, local courts’ willingness to assist arbitration, enforcement of awards and the available remedies, both final and interim.

UAE Competition Law-Prescribed Fees Announced

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) Federal Cabinet has now issued Cabinet Decision 105 of 2026 (the Cabinet Decision) On Fees Prescribed for the Implementation of Federal Decree-Law 36 of 2023 Regulating Competition (the Law). The Cabinet Decision sets (for the first time) fees payable for requests filed pursuant to the Law.

 

Service fees

 

The following fees have been prescribed:

 

➢ Exemption request under Article 5 of the Law – restrictive agreements: AED 5,000

 

➢ Exemption request under Article 6 of the Law – dominant position: AED 5,000

 

➢ Exemption request under Article 7 of the Law – economic dependency: AED 5,000

 

➢ Exemption request under Article 8 of the Law – price reduction: AED 5,000

 

➢ Economic concentration clearance request: 0.02% of the total annual sales value of all establishments participating in the concentration, capped at AED 150,000

 

➢ Objection to an economic concentration: AED 1,500

 

➢ Grievance against decisions issued pursuant to the Competition Law: AED 500 (refundable if the grievance is accepted)

 

Entry into force

 

The Cabinet Decision shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force 30 days after the date of its publication. The Cabinet Decision was signed by His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, President of the Council of Ministers, on 12 June 2026 but we await confirmation of the Cabinet Decision’s inclusion in the Official Gazette. ■

Shipping (UAE chapter), Lexology Panoramic

This multi-jurisdictional reference guide features a UAE chapter, authored by Chatura Randeniya (partner), Mevan Bandara (partner) and Noran Al Mekhlafi (associate), and provides local insights into newbuilding contracts; ship registration and mortgages; limitation of liability; port state control; classification societies; collision, salvage, wreck removal and pollution; ship arrest; judicial sale of vessels, carriage of goods by sea and bills of lading; shipping emissions; ship recycling; jurisdiction and dispute resolution; international conventions; and recent trends.

 

Other jurisdictions covered by the guide include Australia, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States.

Employment Claims under the New Civil Code: Understanding Article 865 and its Relationship with the Employment Law

The new Civil Transactions Act of 2025 (“the New Code”), which came into force on 01 June 2026, introduces a new provision governing limitation period for certain employment-related claims. Article 865 establishes a two-year limitation period for claims arising from employment contracts, while also creating a special rule for commission, profit-sharing, and revenue-based entitlements. The jurisprudence of the UAE Courts of Cassation has consistently established the principle that the special rule prevails over and restricts the application of the general rule. Against this background, an important legal question arises concerning the relationship between Article 865 of the New Code and Article 54 (9) of the Federal Decree by Law No. (33) of 2021 Regulating Labor Relations (“the Employment Law”), particularly as both provisions govern limitation periods applicable to employment claims while adopting different approaches regarding the commencement of such periods. This inBrief examines the interaction between the two provisions and considers whether Article 865 merely supplements the Employment Law or may affect its operation in practice.

 

Article 54 (9) of the Employment Law: Expanding Judicial Protection for Employees

 

Article 54 (9) of the Employment Law provides that:

 

“The case for any rights entitled under the provisions of this Law by Decree shall not be heard after the lapse of two years as of the date of work relation termination”.

 

This provision establishes a clear limitation period applicable to employment claims arising under the Employment Law. The wording of the article indicates that all rights arising from the employment relationship must be judicially claimed within a maximum period of two years from the termination of the employment relationship.

 

The significance of this provision becomes more apparent when compared with the position under the previous Employment Law, which provided for a limitation period of one year from the date on which the right became due.

 

The former legislative approach created substantial practical difficulties for employees. In many employment relationships, particularly where there exists economic dependency or imbalance in bargaining power, employees may hesitate to initiate claims against their employers while still employed.

 

It appears that Article 54 (9) was intentionally designed to remedy this imbalance and strengthen employee protection. By linking the commencement of the limitation period to the termination of the employment relationship rather than the accrual of the right itself, the legislature effectively ensured that employees are granted a meaningful opportunity to pursue their claims without fear of jeopardizing their employment status during the subsistence of the contractual relationship.

 

Article 865 of the New Code: A Distinct Approach to Variable Financial Entitlements

 

Article 865 (1) of the New Code provides that:

 

“Actions arising from an employment contract are not heard after the lapse of two years from the date of termination of the employment relationship, except in relation to commission, profit sharing, and percentages of total revenue, in which the period does not commence except from the time the employer delivers to the employee a detailed statement of the final financial entitlements”.

 

At first glance, the article appears broadly consistent with Article 54 (9) of the Employment Law, as both provisions establish a two-year limitation period commencing from the termination of the employment relationship.

 

However, Article 865 makes an important distinction between ordinary employment rights and a specific category of financial entitlements, namely, commissions, profit sharing arrangements, and agreements to share percentages of total revenue.

 

With respect to these categories, the two-year limitation period does not commence upon termination of the employment relationship. Instead, it begins only when the employer delivers to the employee a detailed statement of the final financial entitlements.

 

This distinction appears to recognise the practical complexity associated with calculating variable compensation schemes. Unlike fixed salaries or clearly quantified benefits, commission structures and profit-sharing arrangements frequently depend upon internal accounting records, financial statements, sales calculations, or revenue assessments that remain within the exclusive control of the employer. In many instances, employees may be unable to ascertain the true value of their entitlements without access to detailed financial disclosures from the employer.

 

In practical terms, the provision enhances an employee’s ability to pursue claims relating to performance-based compensation where the relevant financial information remains within the employer’s control.

 

The Applicability of Article 865 of the New Code: Supplementing or Contradicting the Employment Law?

 

While the Employment Law is the special legislation governing employment relationships and generally prevails over the New Code as a general law, Article 865 may operate as a supplementary protection for employees rather than a conflicting rule.

 

Article 865 introduces a specific limitation rule for commission, profit-sharing, and revenue-based entitlements where calculation depends on information controlled by the employer. In practice, because employers often provide final financial statements after termination, applying Article 865 may extend the employee’s ability to claim beyond the ordinary two-year period and would therefore align with the protective purpose of labour legislation.

 

However, if the employer provides the financial statement before termination, a literal application of Article 865 could cause the limitation period to begin earlier than the period provided under Article 54(9), potentially reducing employee protection.

 

Accordingly, while the Employment Law remains the primary framework, Article 865 may supplement it where it provides greater protection to employees. The extent of its interaction with Article 54(9) will ultimately depend on judicial interpretation. ■

Liquidated Damages under the New UAE Civil Code: Between Contractual Freedom and Judicial Fairness

Liquidated damages have long constituted a fundamental mechanism for allocating contractual risk, particularly in construction and commercial agreements, by allowing parties to predetermine compensation payable in the event of breach. While the concept was recognised under the previous Civil Transactions Act of 1985 (the “Old Code”) the New Civil Transactions Act of 2025 (the “New Code“) introduces a more structured framework governing judicial intervention in agreed compensation clauses. Unlike the former provision Article 390 which granted courts unfettered discretionary authority to amend agreed compensation to reflect the actual loss suffered, Article 340 of the New Code adopts a more detailed structure that expressly regulates when and how judicial intervention may occur.

 

The revised framework seeks to balance contractual freedom with the need to prevent disproportionate or unjust compensation. As consequence, the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses may increasingly depend on considerations of proportionality and fairness, rather than the singular issue of whether the liquidated damages agreed upon reflect the actual loss suffered.

 

These developments are likely to have significant practical implications for contractors, employers, commercial parties, and legal practitioners, particularly in relation to contractual drafting, evidentiary preparation, dispute management, and litigation strategy.

 

What Has Changed?

 

Article 390 of the Old Code permitted contracting parties to agree in advance on the amount of compensation payable upon breach of contract. However, the same provision granted the courts (and arbitrators, where applicable) broad discretionary power to amend the agreed compensation if it did not correspond to the actual loss suffered. Any contractual attempt to exclude the court’s power was considered void. Importantly, the Old Code contained no guidance as to how the court may exercise its power.

 

While the New Code continues to recognise the validity of liquidated damages clauses, it introduces a more structured framework for judicial intervention by setting out guidelines for the exercise of the court’s power to adjust the quantum of damages in both upwards and downwards directions, depending on the circumstances of the case.

 

Pursuant to Articles 340 (2) and 340 (3), a debtor is entitled to seek a reduction of the agreed compensation in the following circumstances:

 

➢ where the agreed liquidated damages are exaggerated or disproportionate to the actual harm suffered;

 

➢ where the original obligation has been partially performed; and

 

➢ where the creditor, through its own fault, contributed to the damage or aggravated its consequences.

 

On the other hand, Article 340 (4) grants the creditor the right to seek an increase in the agreed compensation in the following circumstances:

 

➢ where the creditor proves that the debtor committed fraud; and

 

➢ where the creditor proves that the debtor committed gross fault.

 

Importantly, Article 340(4) permits the court to determine that no compensation is payable at all where the creditor’s own fault has completely absorbed the debtor’s fault. This reflects a more nuanced approach to the allocation of contractual responsibility and the assessment of damages.

 

Under the New Code, the issue of actual loss suffered may come into play where a debtor seeks to argue that the agreed liquidated damages are exaggerated or disproportionate and therefore should be reduced. However, it appears that a creditor may no longer seek an increase in the amount payable as liquidated damages on the grounds that the creditor in fact suffered greater actual loss.

 

Cassation Courts and the Future Interpretation of Article 340:

 

The practical application of Article 340 is likely to give rise to several important questions that remain open for interpretation. One of the principal questions is whether the situations expressly mentioned by the legislature regarding the debtor’s right to seek reduction of liquidated damages, and the creditors seek an increase in agreed compensation, are exhaustive and restrictive in nature, or whether the courts may extend such intervention by way of analogy or broader equitable considerations.

 

Equally significant is the question of how the courts will define and distinguish “gross fault” from ordinary fault, particularly given that the new provision expressly permits increasing liquidated damages only in cases involving fraud or gross fault. This also raises the question of how the courts may approach situations where the debtor’s conduct constitutes fault, negligence, or breach, but does not reach the threshold of gross fault? Whether ordinary fault alone may justify any form of judicial intervention beyond the agreed compensation remains unclear under the statutory text.

 

Another key issue is likely to be whether the courts will permit damages in excess of the actual loss suffered by a creditor, if it is able to prove fraud or gross fault by a debtor. It appears unlikely, given that Article 339 (which addresses the position where the parties have not agreed liquidated damages) retains the concept of the judge awarding damages to reflect the actual loss suffered, and as the concept of punitive damages is contrary to Sharia law.

 

Practical Takeaways: Dos and Don’ts

 

Dos

 

➢ Do clearly define the triggering events for liquidated damages, including delay, non-performance, or partial breach.

 

➢ Do ensure proportionality between the agreed compensation and the anticipated commercial loss, especially if you are the party likely to be claiming liquidated damages, as disproportionality is a ground for downward revision, and not upward revision.

 

➢ Do draft precise and unambiguous clauses to avoid disputes concerning interpretation.

 

Don’ts

 

➢ Do not treat liquidated damages as punitive penalties, as the Civil Code recognises compensation rather than punishment.

 

➢ Do not ignore evidentiary requirements, especially when seeking upward revision of agreed compensation. ■